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The rapid rise in health insurance premiums overthe last 2 years raises questions about what willhappen to the employer-provided insurance mar-
ket. Because most Americans obtain health insurance
through the workplace, a concern is that employees and
their dependents will end up without coverage or with
much less adequate coverage. Whereas some small
firms will almost certainly respond to rapid premium
increases by dropping coverage for all employees, large
firms are unlikely to do so because virtually all offer
coverage and have been doing so for years. Rather, large
firms are likely to require employees to pay a larger por-
tion of their health insurance premiums. The percent-
age of covered workers whose employers pay the full
cost of single coverage declined from 30% in 2001 to just
23% 1 year later.1 This fact raises the question of how
employees respond to these price changes—will they
switch to less generous coverage or forego coverage
completely?
Previous studies have examined the demand
response to premium-sharing arrangements.2-5 For
example, in a 1984 study of the health plan choices
made by employees in 20 Minneapolis firms, Feldman
and colleagues2 estimated nested logit models of insur-
ance coverage in firms offering health maintenance
organization (HMO) and fee-for-service (FFS) insur-
ance. They found that employee choices were sensitive
to out-of-pocket premiums and that employees choos-
ing HMOs were more sensitive to price. This result may
reflect the status quo in 1984, when HMOs were gener-
ally the lower cost option. Today, HMOs are not neces-
sarily the least expensive option; more recent work by
Feldman and associates6 indicated that firms that offer
HMOs do not have lower healthcare costs than compa-
nies that do not.
Our goal was to examine health plan choices within
a flexible benefit plan. Firms offering these plans give
employees a fixed benefit allocation. Employees then
decide how to allocate these “credits” between health
benefits, pensions, life insurance, or other benefits.
Funds not spent on health insurance can be used to pur-
chase other benefits or increase take-home earnings;
thus, employees pay the full marginal cost of electing a
more expensive health plan. Such cafeteria-style plans
cover 13% of workers in medium and large firms, and
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Objective: To determine the sensitivity of employees’ health
insurance decisions—including the decision to not choose health
maintenance organization or fee-for-service coverage—during
periods of rapidly escalating healthcare costs.
Study Design: A retrospective cohort study of employee plan
choices at a single large firm with a “cafeteria-style” benefits plan
wherein employees paid all the additional cost of purchasing more
generous insurance.
Methods: We modeled the probability that an employee would
drop coverage or switch plans in response to employee premium
increases using data from a single large US company with employ-
ees across 47 states during the 3-year period of 1989 through 1991,
a time of large premium increases within and across plans.
Results: Premium increases induced substantial plan switching.
Single employees were more likely to respond to premium increas-
es by dropping coverage, whereas families tended to switch to
another plan. Premium increases of 10% induced 7% of single
employees to drop or severely cut back on coverage; 13% to
switch to another plan; and 80% to remain in their existing plan.
Similar figures for those with family coverage were 11%, 12%, and
77%, respectively. Simulation results that control for known
covariates show similar increases. When faced with a dramatic
increase in premiums—on the order of 20%—nearly one fifth of
the single employees dropped coverage compared with 10% of
those with family coverage.
Conclusions: Employee coverage decisions are sensitive to rap-
idly increasing premiums, and single employees may be likely to
drop coverage. This finding suggests that sustained premium
increases could induce substantial increases in the number of unin-
sured individuals.
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the proportion is growing; thus these plans are interest-
ing to study in their own right.7
Our analysis was similar in spirit to that of
Buchmueller and Feldstein,8 who had examined a poli-
cy change by the University of California that capped
employer contributions at the cost of the least expen-
sive health plan offered. They found that premium
increases induced high rates of plan switching.
Buchmueller and Feldstein speculated that the well-
publicized policy switch may have influenced their
results. Cutler and Reber9 also examined demand
response to a substantial benefits policy change at
Harvard University and found similar large effects. Our
work complemented findings from both studies by con-
firming this price sensitivity using multiyear data,
although the firm in question did not experience any
dramatic change in its compensation policy.
METHODS
Our data came from a single large company in the
United States that offered a flexible benefits plan.
Employees paid out-of-pocket for the difference in pre-
miums between the chosen plan and a low-cost cata-
strophic health insurance policy. Employees paid the
additional premium cost on a pretax basis. We acquired
data on employees’ health plan decisions from 1989
through 1991, allowing us to examine how changes in
relative prices affected plan choices over 3 years. The
advantage of this period was that it was a time when
firms experienced premium increases well above the
rate of inflation—similar to the rapid premium growth
from 2000 through 2002 (for which data were not avail-
able).
Modeling Plan Changes
In modeling health insurance choices, we focused on
the probability that an individual would choose an alter-
native in year t + 1 that differed from the one chosen in
year t. The responsiveness of demand could then be
measured by looking at how this probability changed
with price changes. Unfortunately, it is not entirely
clear in a reduced-form analysis exactly what the appro-
priate measure of price should be. Economists working
with firm-level data have used variation in employer
contributions, tax rates, loading fees, or standardized
policies to proxy for price changes.10-13 Because our data
was from a single firm, we could not exploit this type of
variation. Rather, we hypothesized that the choice of a
health plan was a function of the relative premiums
within the set of feasible plan alternatives, similar to the
assumption of Long and colleagues.13
As with many flexible benefits plans, the employer
provided a partial subsidy to the purchase of health
insurance. In this case, the employer paid the full cost
of a catastrophic FFS plan. If employees elected a more
generous FFS health plan with a lower deductible or any
of the 50 HMOs offered, they were required to pay the
additional premium cost either through credits or pay-
roll deductions. We used data from the 3-year period of
1989 through 1991. While these data are old, this peri-
od has the advantage that it was a time of large premi-
um increases, both within and across plans. It also is
comparable to periods covered in other studies.
Multinomial Logit Model of Choice. The multinomi-
al logit (MNL) model of choice requires the well-known
condition of the independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives. The independence of irrelevant alternatives is
tantamount to assuming that the stochastic portions of
the conditional utility functions are uncorrelated across
alternatives, and imposes the restriction that the cross-
price elasticities are the same across all alternatives.14
One alternative to the MNL is the nested MNL. This
model allows for correlation across subgroups of alter-
natives (closer substitutes) so that price elasticities are
more elastic within groups than across groups.
Unfortunately, the structure of our dataset did not allow
for the estimation of such a model, since we did not
have any right-hand side variables except premium that
varied across choices. The right-hand side variable was
actually the “increase or decrease in cost associated
with the status quo plan”—ie, the plan chosen in the
previous period. Thus our ability to draw certain infer-
ences was limited; for example, we could not infer what
would happen if another plan were added to the system.
We first estimated an MNL model in which each
employee at time t faced 3 choices: (1) keep the plan
that he or she chose in time t–1; (2) switch plans; or (3)
choose the free option, which means dropping health
insurance or switching to the catastrophic FFS plan.
(Although the catastrophic plan with individual cover-
age was always a free alternative, approximately 11% of
the sample chose no insurance. This choice may have
been related to coverage through a family member or
partner outside the firm. Unfortunately, we did not have
any information on alternate sources of insurance.
Therefore, we treated the decisions of dropping health
insurance or switching to the catastrophic option as
equivalent in this report.)
We assumed that the probabilities of undertaking
each of these actions was a function of the change in the
relative premium, controlling for a limited set of covari-
ates, including total compensation, age, sex, tenure in
the job, marital status, plan and state dummies, and pos-
sibly some interactions. We included compensation on
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the job because higher-income employees may be less
responsive to price changes and because the deductible
in the catastrophic plan was equal to 5% of salary. We
hypothesized that workers with greater job tenure may
have had more inertia about changing plans, and that
workers with greater expected use of healthcare (older
workers, women, or workers with families) may have
been less likely to change plans if they had to change
providers, as a change between HMO and FFS plans
might require. Plan dummies were included to capture
the relative attractiveness of individual plans and state
dummies were included to account for systematic,
unmeasured geographic differences.
Our measure of price was based on relative premi-
ums, defined as the premium of an individual’s plan
divided by the average for all competing plans in that
market. It is useful to note that the actual change in
an individual’s expenses could deviate from this
amount if he or she switched plans; hence, we used
the term “incipient premium increase” to describe
this variable.
Data
The data consisted of 3 years (1989-1991) of earn-
ings and benefit information for 14 221 employees at
a single US company. Not all employees worked all
years, so the entire data-
set consisted of 31 907
employee-years of data.
After eliminating employees
aged 65 years or older, and
a few observations with
inconsistent or incomplete
data, the employees were
geographically dispersed
across 47 states, with most
living in California, New
Jersey, or Texas. Table 1
presents descriptive statis-
tics across all employee-
years. Employees were on
average 37 years old with 6
years of experience with
the company; two thirds
were female.
The company offered 2
types of health insurance
plans: FFS plans and
HMOs. Nearly all the
employees (89%) enrolled
in the employer’s health
insurance plan. Table 2
shows that within the FFS
class, 3 types of plans were available: a catastrophic
plan with a deductible of 5% of salary, a low option plan
with deductibles of $300 for individuals and $600 for
families, and a high option plan with deductibles of
$150 and $300. The other options consisted of 43 HMOs
nationwide, with each employee’s available choices
depending on geographic residence and year. Each plan
offered 3 coverage levels: employee only (individual),
employee plus 1 dependent (couple), and family.
As with most employers, this company contributed
toward the purchase of these plans. Unlike many
employers, however, the amount did not vary by plan
choice, but depended only on the number of beneficiar-
ies (Table 3). By not contributing more generously to
more expensive plans, the employer avoided subsidizing
expensive plans and ensured that employees faced the
full marginal cost of more generous coverage (on a pre-
tax basis). In general, the size of the employer contri-
bution was equal to the premium for the catastrophic
plan. The employer contribution was always equal to
the premium on the catastrophic plan for individual
coverage, but in 1991 the employer instituted modest
copremiums for catastrophic coverage of families and
couples. 
To construct a dataset to evaluate employee insur-
ance choices, we needed to account for several data
Responses to Premium Increases
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, 1989 to 1991
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Age (years) 37.48 10.25 18 64
Tenure (years) 6.39 6.14 0 44
Income ($) 31 551.81 18 964.19 6630 428532
Benefits ($) 1339.43 1036.53 0 11 132
Total compensation ($) 32 262.41 19 165.42 7145 433 342
Credit allocation ($) 710.60 220.29 500 4810
Female 0.67 0.47 0 1
Single 0.33 0.47 0 1
Couple 0.29 0.45 0 1
Single parent 0.06 0.24 0 1
Family 0.31 0.46 0 1
Have health insurance 0.89 0.31 0 1
Enrolled in HMO 0.28 0.45 0 1
Enrolled in FFS 0.61 0.49 0 1
Year 1989.97 0.82 1989 1991
N = 31 907. Total compensation is equal to income plus credit allocations.
FFS indicates fee for service; HMO, health maintenance organization.
issues, as noted below. The results did not appear undu-
ly sensitive to these steps:
1. We did not have precise information concerning
other sources of coverage through family mem-
bers. Several pieces of information suggested such
coverage existed. For instance, some eligible
employees did not sign up for any health plan,
including the free catastrophic plan. We chose to
restrict our attention to employees enrolled in
noncatastrophic health insurance plans during the
previous year. These employees were paying some
sort of copremium, so we knew they assigned a
nontrivial value to health insurance through this
employer. This tactic reduced the sample by
approximately 11% and, in some respects, limits
our inferences to the sizable majority of employ-
ees who are currently paying a copremium for
insurance.
2. In the case of single employees, we excluded 95
employees who switched from a single policy to a
couple or family plan. We did so because these
employees appeared to have had substantial
lifestyle changes (eg, they got married or had chil-
dren). It could be assumed that employees might





about the same propor-
tion reduced their pre-
mium as increased or
maintained their pre-
mium (46% and 54%,
respectively), suggest-




es. We assumed that
married employees who
changed the number of
dependents only did
not switch plans.
3. Ten health plans ceased
to exist during the peri-
od of observation. We excluded the affected employees
from our analysis because we were interested only in
voluntary switching behavior. Thus we excluded 137
single employees and 200 employees with families.
Consequently, our final subsample contained
12 936 observations of employee plan decisions, of
which 4491 were for single workers and 8445 were for
married workers. Table 2 shows a distinct downward
trend in HMO enrollment—from 31% in 1989 to 24% in
1991. This decline might be explained in part by pre-
mium changes during the study period.
RESULTS
Changes in Health Plans
Table 4 displays the different types of transitions in
insurance for single and married employees. Most
employees kept their plan. In both 1990 and 1991,
about 7% of the singles and 10% of the families dropped
health insurance or shifted to the catastrophic option.
For singles, the percentage of those changing plans was
12% to 13%, about half of whom switched systems (ie,
changed from an HMO plan to an FFS plan or vice
versa). For families, the percentage of those changing
plans (outside and within systems) was 11% to 14%.
Families were more likely to switch from an HMO plan
to an FFS plan (10%) than vice versa (3%).
Of the singles who switched plans, almost half of the
FFS participants switched to HMOs (5.6% of all singles
switched to HMOs vs 6.7% who switched within the FFS
sector). A similar pattern emerged for those singles in
the HMO. Employees with family coverage showed a
diminished predilection to switch out of the system.
POLICY
44 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MANAGED CARE JANUARY 2004
Table 2. Employee Insurance Choices, 1989 Through 1991
Percent Choosing Plan in
Plan Type Deductible 1989 1990 1991
FFS
Catastrophic 5% of salary 11.5 13.9 20.3
High deductible $300/$600 7.6 9.2 13.5
Low deductible $150/$450 40.3 37.5 30.4
HMO* 30.8 28.4 24.4
No insurance 9.8 11.0 11.4
Number of employees 11 199 10 479 10 232
*A total of 43 different HMOs were offered—we did not break out enrollment by each plan as we
do for FFS.
FFS indicates fee for service; HMO, health maintenance organization.
Table 3. Employer Contributions to Plan Premiums
Coverage 1989 1990 1991
Individual $506 $600 $700
Couple $906 $1000 $1100
Family $1256 $1349 $1450
Among those in the HMO, 9.5%
switched within the HMO sector
versus 5% who switched to FFS.
Not shown in Table 4 is how
premiums changed for those
employees. Among singles who
switched plans, 78% paid less
than they would have paid had
they kept the same plan. Among
families, that figure was 81%.
This finding suggests that many
individuals who switched plans
did so to reduce their annual
premium.
Models of Switching Behavior
We estimated our models
separately for single individuals
and families. Table 5 presents the parameter estimates,
standard errors, and P values for the MNL estimates of
the probability of either dropping insurance or switch-
ing plans relative to keeping the current plan. The cru-
cial parameter in our analysis was the coefficient of the
annual relative premium increase. For singles and fam-
ilies, the increase in the relative premium for the plan
held in the prior year had a significant positive effect on
the probability of switching to the catastrophic plan or
dropping plans. An increase in the relative premium
also significantly increased the probability of switching
to another plan with a nonzero premium. This finding
confirmed our previous intuition: that employees would
respond to price increases by disenrolling from plans
whose relative price increased. In general, single work-
ers were more likely to leave their current plan than
families. Older workers and those with more tenure on
the job were less likely to change insurance plans.
We initially allowed the continuous variables (age,
tenure, and total compensation) to have nonlinear
effects on the propensity to switch plans. The coeffi-
cients on these interactions were not statistically signif-
Responses to Premium Increases
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Table 4. Change in Health Plan Choice by Previous System of Care
Percent (%) Taking Action in Year t
Type of Switch to Switch
Insurance in Drop Move to Other Within Keep
Year t-1 n Plan Catastrophic System System Plan
Singles 4491 1.0 6.1 6.0 7.0 79.8
FFS 2530 0.8 6.3 5.6 6.7 80.4
HMO 1961 1.4 5.8 6.3 7.4 79.0
Families 8445 3.3 7.2 5.0 7.3 77.0
FFS 5773 2.5 7.0 3.0 8.4 79.0
HMO 2672 5.0 7.6 9.5 5.0 73.0
FFS indicates fee for service; HMO, health maintenance organization.
Table 5. Results From Multinomial Logit Model of Insurance Decision (Drop, Switch, or Keep)
Singles Families
Estimate SE P>|z| Estimate SE P>|z|
Dropping coverage
Intercept −1.179 0.358 .001 0.307 0.277 .267
Relative premium increase (%) 13.682 1.767 .000 1.927 0.581 .001
Total compensation –0.001 0.005 .754 –0.018 0.003 .000
Age –0.034 0.008 .000 –0.046 0.006 .000
Female –0.200 0.137 .145 0.182 0.118 .122
Tenure –0.063 0.018 .000 –0.033 0.010 .001
Switching plans
Intercept –0.935 0.249 .000 –1.018 0.235 .000
Relative premium increase (%) 4.925 1.180 .000 4.560 0.507 .000
Total compensation 0.012 0.003 .002 0.006 0.0016 .000
Age –0.030 0.006 .000 –0.032 0.0049 .000
Female 0.127 0.108 .240 –0.058 0.089 .510
Tenure –0.029 0.010 .005 –0.013 0.007 .073
icant, and they did not change the magnitude and sig-
nificance of the other parameters on prices.
Because the MNL model does not provide obvious
insight as to the quantitative effects of premium changes,
we simulated the effects of various across-the-board rela-
tive premium increases on switching and disenrollment
behavior. The average relative premium for singles was
equal to 0.5, whereas for married workers it was equal to
0.9. The fact that the relative premium is lower for single
workers means that a disproportionate share of them
enrolled in the lower cost plans, as one might expect.
For both groups we simulated the effect of 0%, 10%,
20%, and 30% annual increases in the relative premium.
Table 6 shows the results of these simulations. With no
increase in premiums, 7% of single employees would
drop their current plan in favor of the catastrophic plan
or no coverage; 13% would switch plans (outside and
within systems); and 80% would keep the existing plan.
For families the percentages are similar. The 7% to 8%
probability of dropping plans when premiums do not
rise is similar to the 5% rate of switching among employ-
ees facing constant premiums found by Buchmueller
and Feldstein.8 When faced with an annual relative pre-
mium increase of 10%, the probability of keeping the
current plan decreased modestly to 72% for singles and
to 76% for families. When faced with a dramatic
increase in premiums—on the order of 20%—one fifth
of the single employees would drop coverage, as would
10% of those with family coverage.
We observed that a 10% increase in the relative pre-
mium reduced the probability of keeping the plan by
about 9% for singles and by 6% for families. The proba-
bility of dropping health insurance (or going into the
catastrophic option) was more responsive for singles
than families. One can speculate this may have some-
thing to do with a concern about financial protection of
spouses and children or that married employees are
intrinsically more cautious. The opposite was true for
the probability of switching. Switching behavior is very
elastic with respect to premium increases for families,
but not so for singles. Thus,
singles appeared more likely
to respond to price increas-
es by dropping insurance,
whereas families tended to
switch to other plans.
The strong statistical sig-
nificance and the sizeable
estimate for the relative pre-
mium suggests that these
effects would have persisted
even if we had been able to
better control for changes in
plan characteristics and individuals’ perceived benefits.
If, for example, insurance companies were trying to
improve their bottom lines by reducing benefits and
increasing premiums, our parameter estimate would be
biased upward. However, the true parameters, although
smaller, would have the same sign and likely would still
been statistically significant.
CONCLUSIONS
Employees who face the full marginal cost of pur-
chasing more costly health plans were responsive to
premium increases. Although many employees dis-
played inertia in their plan choice, increases in relative
premiums induced plan switching. Single employees
were more likely than employees with family coverage
to adjust to premium rises by dropping insurance.
Families appeared more likely to switch to another plan.
Among employees who made a change in plans from
one year to another, those whose own plan premium
rose relative to others in the same system (HMO or FFS)
were more likely to switch to another plan within the
system. Those whose premium rose relative to plans
outside the system were more likely to change systems.
The results suggest that employees facing much higher
copremiums to renew their current health plan are like-
ly to drop coverage or switch to another plan.
Limitations
Some caveats should be noted. First, premium
changes may reflect changes in benefit generosity. In
that case, higher premiums reflect more desirable goods
and, hence, are not true measures of the price change.
If this statement is true, then premium changes are an
upper bound on price changes, and will exacerbate any
price effect. On the other hand, measurement error in
prices could bias the observed responses downward.
Further, the utility of alternative health plans also
depends on other characteristics of plans such as quality
of providers or flexibility in access to providers, or finan-
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Table 6. Simulated Probabilities of Changing Coverage
Single Family
Premium
Increase Drop Switch Keep Drop Switch Keep
0% 0.076 0.130 0.793 0.082 0.111 0.806
10% 0.126 0.149 0.723 0.090 0.154 0.755
20% 0.200 0.163 0.635 0.097 0.209 0.693
30% 0.296 0.170 0.532 0.102 0.276 0.620
cial features such as copayments, deductibles, and cost-
sharing policies. Not only do these characteristics change
over time, but so does the information that the employee
receives about them. The employee learns not only from
health plan literature and his or her own experiences, but
also through his or her awareness of the experiences of
other individuals.15 Thus, changes in the perceived bene-
fits of alternative plans might also produce shifts that are
independent of the premiums. We expected that changes
in plan characteristics and individuals’ awareness were
not important during the relatively short period of analy-
sis. Thus given our dataset we limited ourselves to esti-
mate models with plan-specific fixed effects.
Another bias may have arisen because we did not
know the entire set of feasible plan choices. We
assumed that all employees had access to each plan,
but this assumption holds only for the FFS plans in our
data. If the insurance opportunity set is not specified
correctly in any given model, a relative premium index
might put too much weight on plans that are not close
substitutes, and too little weight on those that are close
substitutes. In that instance, we might detect an appar-
ent unresponsiveness of employees to changes in the
relative premiums (ie, the overall relative price index is
changing but the prices of the feasible plans do not). To
investigate this issue, we examined responsiveness to 2
price indexes in this framework: one for the current
plan relative to prices of close substitutes within the
system of care (FFS or HMO) and another relative to
average prices of plans in the other system of care.
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